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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the change of the post-
listing operating performance of the firms listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 1991 and 1992. A significant 
decline in operating performance, measured by operating 
return on assets and operating profit margin, subsequent to 
the initial public offerings (IP〇s) is found. The operating 
performance of IPO firms is compared with other listed 
firms matched with similar business and size. The results 
show that the decline in the performance of IPOs cannot be 
attributed to the industry effect and lack of sales 
opportunities. In this study, agency cost problem, window 
dressing and peak timing issue are proposed to explain the 
decline of the operating performance of the IP〇s. The 
agency cost problem appears to explain the decline in the 
IP〇 performance. Peak timing issue and agency cost 
explanation receive support in the comparison among Hong 
Kong manufacturing sector, manufacturing IP〇s and 
manufacturing matching firms. Window dressing does not get 
any support in both cases. In addition, the P/E ratio of 
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IPOs is statistically no different from the P/E ratio of 
the matching firms. 
2 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the change 
in the operating performance of the firms after their 
initial public offerings (IP〇s) in Hong Kong. The 
measurements of the operating performance are the operating 
return on assets and the operating profit margin while 
operating return on assets can seek to assess the 
effectiveness of the management in generating operating 
profit from the assets, operating profit margin can be used 
to show the marginal increase in operating profit generated 
by extra sales. 
In Hong Kong, there are no available database which 
contains both the pre-listed and post-listed financial 
information of the IP〇 firms. So, the first step of this 
thesis is to construct this database. The firms chosen to 
form the database is the companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong in 1991 and 1992. The number of 
listings in these two years is 102, which is the largest 
number of listings since the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange in 1986. 
^ 
J 
In my sample, three financial companies are excluded 
from analysis； they are one bank, one insurance company and 
one financial services company. These financial companies 
were excluded because their balance sheets do not have 
、、sales" figures. The method for analyzing these financial 
companies is different from industrial companies, and it is 
impossible to relate the change of the operating 
performance to the change of sales. So, for consistency, it 
is better to exclude these three companies. 
After the construction of the IP〇s database, each IPO 
firm is matched with another listed firm in Hong Kong in 
order to compare their performances. The matching firms 
chosen are firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at 
least one year prior to and have similar size with the IP〇 
firms. The aim of the matching is to investigate whether 
the change in the operating performance of IP〇 firms can be 
attributed to the industry effect. The sales growth of the 
IP〇 firms and matching firms are also compared. The result 
can explain the difference of performance between the IP〇 
firms and the matching firms. In the case where industry 
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effect and lack of sales opportunities cannot explain the 
change in the operating performance of the IP〇 firms, this 
paper proposes three potential explanations, namely, agency 
cost problem, window dressing and peak timing issue. 
Agency cost problem arise because of the separation of 
the ownership and management. Management may not maximize 
the value of the firm, i.e. the wealth of the owner. As a 
result, the firm will suffer. Then the performance of the 
firm worsens. Window dressing means that the pre-listed 
figures are overstated but the post-listed figures are 
understated. The overstated pre-IPO performance would 
decline after the completion of IPO and reaches to a level 
lower than the industry counterpart. Peak timing issue 
supposes that management understands the firm more than 
outsiders. Management decides to publicly issue the holding 
company shares when they know the firm is operating at the 
period of "unusually" good performance. As it is believed 
that this superiority cannot be sustained after the public 
offering, it is therefore the best time to raise capital 
from public. 
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To seek support for the proposed explanations, a sub-
sample of manufacturing IP〇 firms and manufacturing 
matching firms are constructed. The performance of these 
sub-samples are contrasted with the performance of the Hong 
Kong manufacturing sector. As a result, an explanation of 
the change of the IP〇s operating performance can be 
deduced. 
Our empirical results show that the operating 
performance of the IP〇 firms in Hong Kong declined during 
the post-IPO period. The decline in the performance of IPOs 
is more significant than their industrial counterpart, i.e. 
matching firms. However, the pre-IPO operating performance 
of the firms is higher than that of the matching firms. In 
addition, the sales of IP〇 firms grow much faster than the 
matching firms during post-IPO period. In light of this, 
the decline in the post-IPO operating performance cannot be 
attributed to the industry effect and lack of sales 
opportunities. 
The potential explanations for this phenomenon include 
agency cost problem, window dressing and peak timing issue. 
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Our results show that the agency cost problem could be a 
reason for the decline in the post-IPOs performance. Peak 
timing issue is granted support in the analysis among the 
Hong Kong manufacturing sector, manufacturing IP〇 firms and 
manufacturing matching firms. However, window dressing 
cannot be considered as an explanation of the decline in 
the operating performance of the IP〇 firms in Hong Kong. 
Besides academic research, the only authorized 
exchange company (with trading floor), the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong Limited {SEHK) also concerns the operating 
performance of the newly listed companies. The SEHK has 
introduced profit requirement for the new listing company 
in 1994. A listing candidate has to achieve at least $20 
million profit before taxation in the most recent financial 
year and a total profit of not less than $30 million for 
the two preceding years. This is a controversy by using 
profit generation as a criterion of quality control of the 
new listing firms in Hong Kong. However, it is still an 
important announcement in Hong Kong because the inferior 
post-listed performance of the IPO firms have raised 
attention from the exchange. 
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since the existing of studies concerning the IP〇s in 
Hong Kong focused solely on the price performance, this 
investigation represents the first attempt to study the 
operating performance of IP〇s in Hong Kong. 
‘ • • . 
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2. Literature Review 
The performance of newly listed stocks is not the sole 
topic in Hong Kong. In United States, there are a lot of 
studies about the return earned by investing on the initial 
public offerings. For example, Ritter (1991) showed that 
initial public offerings appear to be overpriced in the 
long run. He studied a sample of 1526 IP〇s of common stock 
that went public in the U.S. in 1975-84. He found that in 
the three years after going public, these IP〇 firms 
significantly underperformed as compared to a set of 
comparable firms matched by size and industry. The average 
holding period return for the IP〇s sample was 34.47% in the 
three years after going public where the holding period 
return is measured from the closing market price on the 
first day of public trading to the market price on the 
three-year anniversaries. For the matching-firm sample, the 
average total return was 61.86% over the same three year 
holding period. Therefore, every dollar invested in a 
portfolio of IP〇s purchased at the closing market price on 
the first day of trading results in a terminal wealth of 
$1.3447, while every dollar in the matching firms results 
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in $1.6186, a ratio of only 0.813. In the long run, IPOs 
underperformed. Moreover, the findings also indicated that 
the underperformance is concentrated among relatively young 
growth companies, especially those going public in the 
high-volume years of the 1980s. Ritter' s paper also 
provides evidence that many firms go public near the peak 
of industry-specific fads, i.e. issuers successfully time 
offers to lower their cost of capital. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) showed companies issuing 
stock during the 1970-1990 period, whether an initial 
public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO), 
have been poor long-run investments for investors. During 
the five years after the issue, they found that investors 
have received average returns of only 5% per year for 
companies going public and only 7% for companies conducting 
a SE〇. However, investing an equal amount at the same time 
in a non-issuing firm with approximately the same market 
capitalization, and holding it for an identical period, 
would have produced an average compound return of 12% per 
year for IP〇s and 15% for SEOs. This implies that 44% more 
money would need to be invested in the issuers than in the 
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nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five 
years after the offering date. In addition, even holding 
both size and the book-to-market ratio constant, they 
showed that issuing firms have lower subsequent returns 
than nonissuers. The poor performance of firms conducting 
SEOs is not a manifestation of long-term return reversals, 
nor is it attributable to the differences in betas. 
Loughran and Ritter's study also shows consistency with a 
market where firms take advantage of transitory windows of 
opportunity by issuing equity when, on average, they are 
substantially overvalued. 
For the study of the operating performance, Muscarella 
and Vetsuypens (1990) found that, after undertaking 
numerous restructuring activities, the reverse leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs) have experienced significant improvements in 
profitability when compared with random samples of publicly 
traded firms over similar time periods. They analyzed 72 
firms which went public since 1983 but were previously 
publicly traded companies or divisions of publicly traded 
companies before their temporary conversion to private 
ownership after the LBOs. Moreover, the managers and 
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directors of their sample companies owned a substantial 
fraction of the equity of the firm after the LBOs and that 
these firms implemented a variety of incentive compensation 
plans. The sample firms experienced dramatic increase in 
leverage but the leverage ratio were gradually reduced over 
time. After reentering capital markets, the firms' leverage 
ratio remained at higher levels than prior to the buyout. 
On average, the sample firms reduced their relative capital 
expenditures but did not implement reductions in 
employment. 
Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) also studied the 
performance of the 62 reverse LBOs firms that went public 
between 1983 and 1987. They found that the return to public 
ownership of reverse LBOs coincides with a peak in their 
operating performance. The operating income as a percentage 
of total assets of the sample LBOs grew by about 7 
percentage points in the pre-offering year. Comparison 
firms in the same industries show a slight decline in the 
same performance measure. Moreover, in the pre-offering 
year, reverse LBOs outperform continuing LBOs. In the year 
after the offering, reverse LBOs disappoint. Their 
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performance worsens dramatically in the first public year, 
falling by about 3 points, which is 10 points below the 
change in their own pervious year and 4 points below their 
public comparison firms. The net change in performance for 
the two-year period from the beginning of the pre-offering 
to the close of the post-offering year is 4 percentage 
points above the norm. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) and Degeorge and 
Zeckhauser (1993) studied the reverse LBOs which is only a 
special kind of initial public offerings. So far, only Jain 
and Kini (1994) who studied the more general operating 
performance of the IP〇s in United States. The paper 
investigates the change in the operating performance of 682 
IP〇 firms as they make the transition from private to 
public ownership during 1976 to 1988. Measured by operating 
return on assets and operating cash flows deflated by 
assets, the operating performance of IP〇s showed a 
significant decline in the post-issue period, both before 
and after industry adjustment. The sample firms exhibit 
high growth in sales and capital expenditures relative to 
firms in the same industry in the post-IPO period. Thus, 
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the declining operating performance of IP〇 firms cannot be 
attributed to a lack of sales growth opportunities or 
cutbacks in post-IPO capital expenditures. IPO firms in 
which entrepreneurs retain higher ownership generally 
demonstrate superior performance relative to other issuing 
firms both before and after adjustment for industry 
effects. 
In Hong Kong, the studies concerning about IP〇s are 
also concentrated on the price performance. Dawson (1987) 
investigated the secondary market price performance of 
initial public offerings in Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Malaysia during the period 1978 through 1984. Dawson's 
paper shows that the market adjusted rapidly to the new 
information and by the first day of trading excess returns 
were no longer available to purchasers in the secondary 
market. In addition, investors who bought in the secondary 
market were unlikely to earn excess returns on average over 
various trading periods ranging from one day to twelve 
months. The results provide evidence that the market priced 
IP〇s efficiently in Hong Kong since prices adjusted rapidly 
to the underpricing of the IP〇s. The early secondary market 
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trading showed no decrease, thus the study also provides 
evidence the initially reported underpricing is not 
overstated. MuGuinness (1992) extends the Dawson (1987) 
study of the underpricing of IP〇s. MuGuinness ‘ s paper 
documents the 80 IP〇s in Hong Kong over the period from 
1980 to mid-1990. His investigation about the post-listing 
returns by investing on the IP〇s indicates that significant 
positive returns occur during the first day of trading and 
disappear thereafter. The initial excess market returns on 
these issues reveal underpricing of nearly 18%. MuGuinness 
(1993) showed that unseasoned Hong Kong stocks, issued 
during 198 0-1990, produced unfavorable long term returns. 
Measuring excess market returns from the first closing 
traded price in the stocks to various closing dates within 
a 24 month (500 day trading) post-listing period, indicated 
that favorable returns within the first months of listing 
were reversed leading to a longer term decline in returns. 
The returns examined within the first 12 months of listing 
were insignificantly different from zero but significant 
negative returns were evidenced between the first day of 
listings in the stocks and the 400th and 500th days of 
listing. The results implied that investments in unseasoned 
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Hong Kong stocks appear to be of questionable value over 
the longer term. The paper also provides reasons of the 
observed return behavior by conducting a number of 
interviews with investment bankers and financial analysts 
in Hong Kong. The first possibility is the underwriters to 
the offerings might be motivated to support newly listed 
stocks in the post-listing period. The second factor 
revealed in the interviews was attributable to a group of 
market makers. They are the major stockholders in the 
market and they could encourage a speculative rise in stock 
prices and, upon subsequent profit-taking, drive prices 
down over the longer term. The third possibility concerned 
the levels of committed capital in the offerings. Once 
capital commitments between principal pre-listing 
stockholders in the offering firms and the investment 
bankers to the issue elapsed, the initial owners in the 
offerings could sell their holdings and drive prices down 
over the longer term. 
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3. Data 
In this section, we construct a database which 
contains the detailed pre-listed and post-listed financial 
information of the IP〇 firms. 
1. Choice of IP〇 Firms 
The sample chosen to form the database is the firms 
processed initial public offerings in 1991 and 1992. Table 
1 below shows that these two years are the period with the 
largest number of listings from 1986, the year of 
establishment of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, to 1992.. 
Table 1. The number of IPOs in Hona Kona from 1986-1993 
Number of IPO in Hong Kong^ 
~~1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
5 n T9 6 r2 48 ^i ^ ~ 
The case of a company to buy a "shell" in order to 
obtain the backdoor listing status is not covered here. 
、、Buying shell" was quite common during 1991 and 1992, 
1 Fact Book, 1986-1993, The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
Limited. 
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especially for the state-owned enterprises in PRC which 
want to obtain a listing status in Hong Kong. 、、Buying 
shell" is to buy a listed company which only involved the 
exchange or trade of a substantial amount of shares of a 
listed company. It is technically different from IPO. 
Buying shell only needs to report to the SEHK but does not 
need to issue the company prospectus. It is actually not 
initial public offerings. 
Since the study of the post-issued operating 
performance will cover at least two to three financial 
years after IP〇 and the financial information about the 
listed firms in 1996 is not yet available, the firms listed 
in 1993 are then excluded from my sample. As well, the IPOs 
listed from 1986 to 1990 are excluded. This is because the 
prospectus of these IP〇s cannot be found and some of these 
IPOs were even delisted before 1991. 
In 1991 and 1992, there are 102 IP〇s but my sample 
consists only 99 of them.^ The IP〇s excluded from my sample 
2 The IP〇s excluded are JCG Holdings Limited, listed on 3 
October 1991; HKCB Bank Holding Company Limited, listed on 
12 October 1992 and National Mutual Asia Limited, listed on 
18 December 1992. 
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are the three financial companies; they are one bank, one 
insurance company and one financial services company. They 
are excluded because their balance sheets do not have 
、、sales〃 figure. Then, the method for analyzing the 
operating performance of these financial companies is 
different from industrial companies and it is impossible to 
relate the change in the operating performance to the 
change of sales. So, for consistency, it is better to 
exclude these three financial companies and the focus of 
this paper will be all of the industrial companies listed 
in 1991 and 1992. 
2. Sources of Data 
The numbers and names of the IP〇 firms are obtained 
from the Fact Books which are published by the Hong . Kong 
Stock Exchange Limited. The Fact Books also provide the 
information of the total number of issue each year, the 
date of issue and the amount of capital raised for each IP〇 
firm. 
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For the IP〇 firms, the data at the year of completion 
of IP〇 are extracted from the company prospectus. The 
company prospectus contains the new issue information of 
(1) the history and development of the issuer, (2) three-
year financial record, (3) details of the directors and 
senior management of the issuer with their detailed 
educational experience, (4) the present trading of the 
issuer and also the future prospects, (5) the auditor's 
report, (6) a property valuation, (7) the base and 
assumptions underlying any profit forecast, and (8) the 
statutory and general information in relation to the 
issue.^ 
The data of IP〇 firms in the post-IPO period are 
mainly extracted from the published annual reports. The 
annual report contains the chairman's statement, financial 
statement, directors‘ report, auditor's report and the 
general corporate information of the company for the past 
12 months, i.e. full financial year.^ 
3 Manual of the Hong Kong Securities Industry, second 
edition, p.91-92. 
4 Manual of the Hong Kong Securities Industry, second 
edition, p.262 . 
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Due to the shortage of some annual reports, some data 
of IPO firms in post-issue period are extracted from 
Wardley Cards and from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets 
(PACAP) database. 
Wardley Cards is a combined file in which each 
individual Wardley Card contains the information of one 
individual listed company such as a brief company summary 
and the corresponding major events. It also provides the 
most recent five-year post-listed financial record, mainly 
earnings, stock prices, price earning ratio, profit and 
loss account and balance sheet, of the company. 
PACAP database consists of historical capital market 
data for 11 countries in the Pacific-Basin region.^ 
Economic statistics and the listed companies information 
are also provided. ^  The available information of each 
individual listing company starts at the date of completion 
5 Data for the following countries are available in PACAP： 
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand. 
6 The heading of PACAP has a little difference from annual 
report. The term "Operating Inc〇me〃 in PACAP is used to 
serve as the ''Operating Profit before Taxation" of the IP〇 
firms. 
2] 
of IP〇.S〇，the pre-IPO information is not available in the 
database. Actually, both Wardley Cards and PACAP only have 
the company information at the post-issue period. The pre-
issue information is not available. So, company prospectus 
are the only available source of the pre-issue data. 
In addition, the Hong Kong Economics Times are also 
used as a reference which can help to check the accuracy of 
the data. Data from PACAP and Wardley Cards are checked and 
verified carefully. If there is any inconsistency among 
these sources, we . would refer the item to Hong Kong 
Economic Times. The data chosen should be consistent with 
these three sources. If the inconsistency cannot be 
verified,工 chose the data from Wardley Card. 
In the paper, every IPO firm in the sample will be 
matched with other listed firms in the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong for comparison of their performance. The data of 
the matching firms are mainly extracted from the PACAP 
database and Wardley Cards. 
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The IP〇s sample and the matching firms will also be 
compared with the Hong Kong manufacturing industry. A sub-
sample of "manufacturing IPOs" and "manufacturing matching 
firms〃 will be constructed. The data for the Hong Kong 
manufacturing sector are referred to the Annual Survey of 
Industrial Production which is published by Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Department. Since the Annual Survey 
of 1994 will be published in October 1996, the most recent 
data for the Hong Kong manufacturing sector is limited to 
1993. In addition, some- detailed breakdown of the data, 
such as the depreciation and the total value of fixed 
assets is not publicly available. Thus, some data are 
obtained from the Industrial Branch of the Census and 
Statistics Department. 
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4. Profile of IPOs in Hong Kong 
Since there are no available database about the IP〇s 
in Hong Kong, study of IP〇s performance can only consult 
with their prospectus. 
From the information in prospectus, the business of 
IP〇s in 1991 and 1992 are concentrated on electronics and 
manufacturing. The number of IP〇s involved in electronics 
or manufacturing business is 58. 
In my sample, the IPOs usually used the newly raised 
capital to invest in mainland China or to develop the 
China-related business. Out of 102 IP〇s, 85 of them are 
engaged in China-related business. The activities include 
(1) building new manufacturing plants and moving the 
production to mainland, (2) direct investment such as 
opening overseas offices in the major cities, (3) joint 
venture with Chinese enterprises, (4) buying Hong Kong 
based companies with well-developed China business and, (5) 
property development in mainland China. The major cities 
attracted these IP〇s to invest are, mostly, located in the 
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Guangdong province. Beijing and Shanghai are also hot 
places. 
On the other hand, there is one company (out of 102) 
worried about the Most Favorite Nation (MFN) status of 
China. This company used the newly raised capital to invest 
in other Asian countries, such as Indonesia, and aimed to 
reduce the MFN influence on its investment in mainland 
China.7 
As a characteristics of Chinese business, most of the 
IP〇s in Hong Kong are family business. The pre-listing 
shares are concentrated on a few number of persons, or 
within a family. After the initial public offerings, the 
initial owners usually retain 75% of the ownership and they 
seldom reduce their ownership after listing. In the 102 
IP〇s, there are 61 of them exactly issued 25% in the public 
offerings, 30 of them listed in 1991 and 31 listed in 1992. 
7 The company is Yue Yuen Industrial Ltd. The business 
mainly is manufacturing and wholesaling sportshoes and 
relates products. Their clients include Adidas, Converse, 
LA Gear, Nike, e.t.c.. 
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For these 102 IP〇s, the two year average subscription 
rate is 46.27, with yearly average of 18.64 in 1991 and 
70.82 in 1992. Among them, only three IP〇s were under-
g 
subscribed, i.e. subscription rate below one. 
The total amount of capital raised by these 102 IP〇s 
are 15.02 billion Hong Kong dollars. In 1991, the amount 
raised is 5.69 billion and the amount raised in 1992 is 
9.33 billion.^ The largest amount of capital raised is 
1076.4 million Hong Kong dollars and the smallest amount is 
3 0.22 million Hong Kong dollar. ^° 
8 The IPOs with subscription rate below one are Giordano 
Holding, Shun Cheong Holdings and National Mutual Asia. 
9 The information of subscription rate and amount of 
capital raised can refer Appendix 1. 
10 National Mutual Asia raised $1076.4 million and Nam Pei 
Hong raised $3 0.22 million in their IP〇s. 
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5. Methodology 
5.1) Measurement of the Operating Performance 
For measurement of the IP〇 operating performance, two 
methods are employed. They are operating return on assets 
and operating profit margin. 
Operating return on assets is the operating profit 
before taxation deflated by the total assets. Operating 
profit before taxation is the net sales less cost of goods 
sold and selling, general and administrative expenses 
before depreciation, depletion and amortization. This ratio 
can reflect the effectiveness of the management in 
generating profit from the assets. 
Operating profit margin is the operating profit 
deflated by the net sales. This ratio can be used to show 
the marginal increase in operating profit by an extra 
sales. 
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For better information, net profit margin is also 
calculated. However, net profit includes the figure of 
extraordinary profit such as disposal of fixed assets. So, 
it is not a good measurement of the operating performance 
of the IP〇 firms. For example, when a firm shows negative 
operating profit, it is still possible for them to get a 
positive net profit in the account. The firm's assets may 
be sold to cover the incurred loss in operation. The amount 
of profit in selling assets will be counted under the term 
of extraordinary profit. So, the net profit margin is not 
suitable for showing the actual performance of the firm. 
The measurement of the change in operating performance 
is at the median level. The median is a better indicator 
than the mean because the mean can easily be influenced by 
the outliers. The change of performance is measured 
relative to the year of IP〇, i.e. Change of Opera ting 
Performancej 
={Operating _Return,, - Opera ting Return^Q} j , where j 
represents the firm, TO represents the pre-IPO fiscal year 
and Ti represents a post-IPO fiscal year of the firm. 
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The post-listed period covered is the three post-IPO 
financial years. According to The Exchange Liisting Rules in 
Hong Kong, the listing company needs to disclose, at least, 
the past three year Profit and Loss account and the latest 
financial period report which must not have ended more than 
six months before the date of the prospectus. So, the data 
of total assets for the past two and three pre-IPO year are 
unavailable and it is impossible to calculate the operating 
return on assets. 
Therefore, in the sample, TO is the financial year 
distinguish listing takes place and T1, T2 and T3 are the 
post-IPO data. 
For industrial comparisons of the change of operating 
performance, each IP〇 firm is matched with other firms in 
the same industry. It is impossible to match the IPO with 
other firms which are not listed on the stock market. This 
is because the Hong Kong Company Law does not have any 
restriction about the disclosure of the financial 
information of the private company. So, it is very 
difficult to find profit figures and the asset value of 
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non-listed companies. Thus, the matching firms chosen are 
the firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at least 
one year prior to the IP〇 firms. Besides, the sizes of the 
IPO firms and matching firms should also be similar. In 
this case, the value of total shareholders‘ equity or net 
book value is used. The data of the matching firms are 
extracted from PACAP. 
In order to get an explanation of the change in 
performance, other accounting measures such as growth rates 
of sales and asset turnover are calculated. ^ ^ 
Growth rate of sales are calculated relative to the 
year of IP〇, i.e. TO. Comparison of the sales growth can 
give an idea of the change in operating performance. If the 
IPO firms have underperformed but with a higher growth rate 
of sales than the matching firms, then the inferior 
performance of IP〇 firms cannot be attributed to the lack 
of sales opportunity. 
11 The 、、Sales〃 value of IPO is quoted from the company 
prospectus and annual reports under the term "Turnover''. 
The sales value of matching were extracted from PACAP under 
the term of 、、Sales〃 . 
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Asset turnover can show the effectiveness of the asset 
to generate extra sales. For the IPO firms, it is possible 
that growth in sales is due to the newly raised capital. 
So, asset turnover, i.e. sales deflated by the total 
assets, can be used to compare the trading performance of 
the IPO firms and matching firms. 
The asset turnover can also be served as a comparison 
between the growth rate of sales and total assets. A 
declining asset turnover means that assets are growing 
faster than sales. Of course, a small asset turnover also 
implies that the profit generating ability of the assets is 
low. 
For comparison, fixed assets may play more important 
role than total assets for generating profit. So, sales 
deflated by fixed assets, net income deflated by fixed 
assets and operating profit deflated by fixed assets of the 
three post-IPO years are also calculated for reference. 
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Summary of the Measurements： 
Measurement 
Operating Performance Operating Return on Assets 
Profit Margin 
Sales Growth Rate of Sales 
Assets Turnover, 
i.e. Sales/ Total Assets 
1. Opera ting Return on Assets = 
Operating Profit before Taxation 
Total Assets 
2. Operating Profit Margin = 
Operating Profit before Taxation 
Sales 
… , Net Profit after Taxation 
3 . Net Profit Margin = 
Sales 
Sales^. —Sales��
4. Sales growth ratSj^- = — , i = 1, 2, 3. 
Sales^^ 
Sal s s 
5. Assets Turnover = 
Total Assets 
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5.2) Reasons for Changes in Performance 
Since industry effect and growth of sales cannot 
explain the change of operating performance, there are 
still some potential explanations. 
5.2.a) Agency Cost Problem 
Due to the separation of the ownership and management 
may not necessarily work towards maximizing the value of 
the firm^. i.e. the wealth of the owner. When a firm goes 
public, the increased conflict of interest between the 
initial owner and the new shareholders will be highlighted. 
As a result, the firm will suffer by the precious 
consumption of manager. Then the performance of the firm 
will worsen. 
In our sample of IP〇s in Hong Kong, most of the 
enterprises are relatively small firms and the share 
distribution is concentrated on a small number of 
substantial shareholders. The owners are usually the 
management of the company. After the public offerings, they 
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still hold 75% of the firm, which is the maximum amount 
limited by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong for a public 
company. It is simply a reduction of ownership. 
The first evidence is derived from the comparison of 
the operating performance of these IP〇s between the pre-
listed and post-listed period. A decline of performance can 
be used to support the agency cost problem. For further 
evidence, the performance of the IP〇s sample and the 
matching firms will be contrasted with the Hong Kong 
manufacturing sector. However, the IPO sample contains not 
only the firms in manufacturing sector, the comparison may 
be less reliable. So, I extract a sub-sample of 
manufacturing IP〇 firms and manufacturing matching firms. 
Comparison between manufacturing matching firms and Hong 
Kong manufacturing sector can be another support of the 
agency cost problem because the manufacturing matching 
firms are the listed manufacturing firms and the data of 
Hong Kong manufacturing sector can be considered as a 
benchmark. In addition, the comparison between IP〇s sub-
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sample and manufacturing sector gives important evidence to 
support the agency cost problem. ^ ^ 
As the data of the Hong Kong manufacturing sector are 
yearly ordered, the IPOs sample and manufacturing IP〇s sub-
sample are separated into two portions for comparison, i.e. 
1991 sample and 1992 sample. The samples will be compared 
with the manufacturing sector for the first and second year 
after their listing. The 1991's IP〇 sample will be compared 
with 1992‘s and 1993‘s manufacturing sector but 1992‘s IPO 
sample can only be compared with 1993‘s manufacturing 
sector. The manufacturing matching firms, however, can be 
compared with the manufacturing sector from 1990 to 1993 . 
12 The aggregate data in the Annual Survey of Industrial 
Production do not have a separation of the listed and 
unlisted companies. Moreover, the break-down of the fixed 
assets and depreciation of the fixed assets are also not 
available. So, it is impossible to extract the data for 
manufacturing sector without listing company. However, the 
percentage of sales and value added of the listing firms 
within the manufacturing sector is less than 3.1 and 5.9 
respectively. It is still reliable to compare the IPO 
figures with the manufacturing sector containing listing 
firms. The percentage of sales of listing firms in 
manufacturing sector from 1989 to 1993 are 2.75, 2.35, 
2 .30, 2 .40 and 3.08. The percentage of value added of 
listing firms in manufacturing sector from 1989 to 1993 are 
3.61, 4.08, 4.11, 4.51 and 5.85. 
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The Annual Survey of Industrial Production do not have 
any information about total assets and the only available 
asset value of manufacturing sector is fixed assets. ^ ^ 
Therefore, the two measures employed are sales deflated by 
fixed assets and net profit deflated by fixed assets. The 
sales value of manufacturing sector includes sales of 
goods, industrial work and industrial services. The 
contents may be a little different from that in the 
prospectus and annual reports. The net profit of 
manufacturing sector is calculated by value added minus 
employees compensation and depreciation of fixed assets. 
Depreciation of fixed assets equals the sum of depreciation 
of plant, machinery and other fixed assets. ^ ^ In this case, 
the agency cost problem can be supported if the performance 
of the IP〇s and/or listed manufacturing matching firms is 
less than manufacturing sector after listing. 
13 The total fixed assets item is not published in the 
Annual Survey. It is required to copy those data form 
Industrial Production Statistics Section of Census & 
Statistics Department. 
14 The data about depreciation are not published in the 
Annual Survey and need to be copied from the Industrial 
Production Statistics Section of Census & Statistics 
Department. 
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5.2.b) Window dressing 
Window dressing means that the pre-listed figures are 
overstated but the post-listed figures are understated. For 
example, if an investment project is expected to last for 
more than one year, the accountant might transfer the cost 
to the year of project completion and thus the cost 〇f the 
first year is understated in order to make the account 
"look good" . So, the return on assets is overstated in the 
first year. 
I n o u r sample, the pre—IPO data of IP〇 are TO. T1, T2 
and T3 are the post-IPO data. Window dressing can be 
supported if the pre-IPO performance is higher than that of 
matching firms and the overstated pre-IPO performance, 
declines after the completion of IP〇 and reaches to an 
level lower than the industry one. It is because the hidden 
cost should surface up after some time. Moreover, the 
performance, in the long run, should return to the industry 
level again. 
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5.2.c) Peak Timing Issue 
The third explanation proposes that management knows 
the firm more than outsiders. When management decides to 
publicly issue the holding company shares, information 
asymmetry between the original owner and the new 
shareholders will arise. This is because management knows 
that the firm is operating at the period of "unusually" 
good performance and .they believe that this superiority 
cannot not be seen again in the future. So, if there is 
required to raise capital, it is the best time. This is 
called peak timing issue. 
The better firm may be chosen to list. Peak timing can 
be supported by the observation that the firm performance 
will be higher than the industry at the pre-listed period. 
However, as history does not repeat itself, the superior 
performance will return to the industry level after the 
completion of IP〇. The observation of the newly listed 
firms shows an above average performance and a declining 
post-listed performance can be served as evidence for peak 
timing issue. 
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5.3) Price to Earning comparison 
In order to find whether the IPO firms are 、、expensive〃 
in the market, the price to earning ratios of IP〇s will be 
compared with the ratios of the matching firms. 
In the event that the P/E of IP〇s is no different from 
matching firms, but performance of IP〇s is worse than 
matching firms, IPOs stocks is more expensive than the 
stocks of similar business and capitalization in the 
market. This is because the capital required to buy the 
same earning is more for IPOs than the other similar 
stocks. 
5.4) Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
All significance tests used in this paper are the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test and Sign test. We will test the 
change of the performance of the IP〇 firms against matching 
firms by the Wilcoxon signed rank test and Sign test. The 
39 
inferences of both tests are concerned with a measure of 
central tendency. 
The procedures of sign test is first to assume a 
random sample of n observations XI, X2, ..., Xn. Then, we 
test the null hypothesis that specifies the median of the 
random sample, M, as the median of the population, M〇,i.e. 
Ho: M=Mo. The sign test statistic is defined as S which is 
the number of plus signs among the n differences Xl-Mo, X2-
M〇,...,Xn-Mo. The null distribution of S is the binomial 
distribution with n and p=0.5. However, for sample size 
greater than 20, we can use the normal approximation to the 
binomial distribution with Z test statistic. The 
alternative to Ho is denoted by A+ ： M>Mo. If A+ is true, 
the number of sample observation larger than Mo will be 
large and therefore S will be large. So, with alternative 
A+, the appropriate rejection region for the test statistic 
S or Z is large values, that is the right tail of the 
sampling distribution of S or Z. 
However, the sign test used only the information about 
signs of the data, and not the information about relative 
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magnitudes. In order to capture the magnitudes effect, 
Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test is desired. Wilcoxon test take the 
absolute values of the differences Xl-Xo, X2-Xo,..., Xn-Xo. 
Then we rank them from 1 to n, keeping track of the 
original signs. The Wilcoxon sign rank test statistic is 
defined as T+, which is the sum of the ranks of all 
positive differences, or T-, which is the sum of the ranks 
of all negative differences. Under the null of M=Mo, it is 
expected that T+ is to be about equal to the corresponding 
T-.is This is because we expect not only that about one 
half of the sample observations will exceed Mo but also 
that the magnitudes of those observations that are larger 
than Mo will be balance off the magnitudes of those smaller 
than Mo. If the alternative A+： M>Mo is true, T+ should be 
much larger than its expected value under Ho. Therefore, 
the appropriate rejection region is in the right tail for 
T+. As the null distribution of T approaches the normal 
distribution, we can use approximation when the sample size 
n is greater then 16 and the rejection region is the right 
tail of the sampling distribution of z. 
15 T- is always positive because it is the sum of the 
ranks. Moreover, the distribution of T+ and T- are 
identical under null hypothesis. 
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We used these tests because these two non-parametric 
tests do not have to assume the distributions of the 
population and the sample. The sign test emphasizes the 
difference between the locations of the two independent 
samples. The Wilcoxon signed rank test mentions the 
difference in magnitudes as well. In our sample, the 
measures are all in median level because the median is a 
better measurement for central tendency. It is due to the 




6.1) Operating Performance of IPO firms 
The operating performance of IP〇 firms is measured by 
the operating return on assets and operating profit margin 
at the median level. However, for better information, the 
measurement at the mean level is also calculated. 
The change in the operating performance of the IP〇 
firms is measured relative to the year prior to IP〇， i.e. 
TO, at median. From table 2, the median operating return on 
assets of IP〇 firms at TO, Tl, T2 and T3 are 0.168854, 
0.13759, 0.07929 and 0.041131 and the corresponding changes 
relative to TO are -0.23013, -0.54961 and -0.68649. They 
are declining over time. Nevertheless, the median value of 
matching firms are 0.09137, 0.079733, 0.078114 and 0.057568 
and the corresponding changes relative to TO are 0.014118, 
0.051827 and -0.2895. The null hypothesis that the decline 
in the operating return on assets of IPOs is not less than 
the matching firms can be rejected by the Wilcoxon sign 
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rank test and Sign test at the 5% level for all of the 
three periods, TO to T1, TO to T2 and TO to T3. 
Table 3 shows that the median level of operating 
profit margin of IP〇 firms at T〇，T1, T2 and T3 are 
0.131583, 0.117006, 0.071422 and 0.059943. The median level 
of marching firms are 0.080541, 0.080541, 0.080485 and 
0.087820. The operating profit margin indicate that the IP〇 
firms outperform the matching firms during pre-IPO period. 
When the firms process IPO, the profit margin declines and 
reaches to a level lower than that of the matching firms. 
The median change in the operating profit margin relative 
to the pre-IPO level, TO, of IP〇 firms are - 0 . 0 3 2 2 , -
0.32 913 and -0.5156 but the correspondence changes of 
matching firms are only 0.054307, 0.039643 and 0.000088. 
The profit margin of IP〇s declines more significantly than 
that of matching firms at 5% level by the Wilcoxon test and 
Sign test. Table 4 gives the data of net profit margin of 
IPO firms and matching firms both at the median and mean 
levels. The net profit margin of IP〇 firms show a similar 
pattern of operating return on assets except that the 
decline in net profit margin from TO to T1 is not 
44 
significant at the 5% level by both Wilcoxon test and Sign 
test. 
Both the operating return on assets and profit margin, 
show that the IP〇 firms outperformed the matching firms 
during pre-IPO period but the performance declines during 
the post-IPO period. The decline in the performance of IP〇 
firms is more significant than that of matching firms at 
the 5% level and the performance of IP〇 firms declines to a 
level lower than the matching firms in the second financial 
year after completion of initial public offerings. Since 
the performance decline of the matching firms is less than 
IPO firms, the decline in the operating performance of IP〇 
firms cannot be attributed to the industry effect. 
Table 5 gives the information about the sales growth 
relative the TO. For the IP〇 firms, the median sales growth 
rate of T1 relative to TO, T2 relative to TO and T3 
relative to TO are 0.213047, 0.494622 and 0.654383 whereas 
the sales growth of the matching firms are 0.133 73 9, 
0.327144 and 0.38094. It is obvious that the sales growth 
of IP〇 is much higher than the matching firms. The higher 
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growth of sales of IPOs is also tested significantly at the 
5% level. 
In addition, when the sales are deflated by total 
assets, i.e. asset turnover, a similar pattern to operating 
return on assets and operating profit margin is found. From 
Table 6, the median asset turnover of IP〇 firms is higher 
than that of matching firms at pre-IPO period. The asset 
turnover then dropped to a level lower than matching firms. 
At the third post-IPO financial year, i.e. T3, the asset 
turnover of IP〇 firms returns to a level higher than that 
of matching firms again. However, the median changes in the 
asset turnover of IP〇 firms are -0.16356, -0.27971 and -
0.996467 which are more significant than those of matching 
firms. In this case, both the Wilcoxon test and Sign test 
are found to be significant at the 5% level. So, according 
to the sales figures, the decline in the operating 
performance of the IPO firms cannot be attributed to the 
lack of sales opportunities in the industries. 
Besides, the change in the asset turnover can also 
serve as comparison between the change in sales and the 
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change in assets. Now, the decline in IPO's asset turnover 
indicates that the IP〇 firms increase their assets faster 
than their sales, and sales generation ability by assets 
are declining overtime as compared to the matching firms. 
6 .2) Agency Cost Problem,_Window dressing and Peak Timing 
Issue 
The operating return on assets of IP〇 firms dropped by 
23,01%, 54.96% and 68.65% at the first, second and third 
financial year after the completion of IPO. The drop of the 
operating profit margin are 3.22%, 32.91% and 51.56%. For 
the matching firms, operating return on assets increased by 
14.12% and 51.83% at the first and second year but dropped 
by 28.95% at the third year. The operating profit margin 
increased by 5.43%, 3.96% and 0.0088%. When we compare 
these two measures, we observe that the operating 
performance of IPO firm declines more significant than that 
of the matching firms at the post—IPO period. Since the IP〇 
firms go public with a reduction of the retained ownership, 
and industry effect and lack of sales cannot not be used to 
47 
explain the phenomena, the decline in operating performance 
can serve as good evidence of the agency cost problem. 
Further support of agency cost explanation can be seen 
from the comparison of the net income over fixed assets and 
net sales over fixed assets among Hong Kong manufacturing 
sector, manufacturing matching firms and the manufacturing 
IP〇s. 
First, from table 8A., the median level of the net 
income deflated by fixed assets of the Hong Kong 
manufacturing sector from 1989 to 1993 are 0.50141, 
� 
0.473386, 0.538599, 0.52772 and 0.489107. The same measure 
on manufacturing matching firms, i.e. listed manufacturing 
firms, from 1990 to 1995 are 0.189528, 0.141252, 0.243322, 
0.190355, 0.182669 and 0 . 081778.^^ 
From table 9A. , the median level of net sales deflated 
by fixed assets of the Hong Kong manufacturing sector from 
1989 to 1993 are 6.048957, 6.130043, 6.413951, 5.809488 and 
16 The manufacturing matching firms are the matching firms 
of the manufacturing IP〇 firms. Manufacturing IP〇 firms are 
the firms carry manufacturing business. 
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5.844561 but the values of manufacturing matching firms 
from 1990 to 1995 are only 3 .627123, 3 .552623, 2 . 862431, 
2.923439, 2.989785 and 0.796188. 
From 1990 to 1993, for both measures, the four annual 
values of manufacturing matching firms are less than the 
half of the values of the Hong Kong manufacturing sector. 
In addition, the data of the manufacturing sector contains 
both the listed and unlisted firms. S〇，if the values of 
listed firms are less than those of the unlisted firms, 
then the reported values of the manufacturing sector are 
understated. Thus, the difference between the matching 
manufacturing firms and unlisted manufacturing firms should 
be larger than the difference between the manufacturing 
matching firms and the whole manufacturing sector. This can . 
be served as good evidence to support existence of agency 
cost. 
Second, the manufacturing IPO firms initially 
outperformed the market which showed a higher net income 
over fixed assets and higher net sales over fixed assets 
than the manufacturing sector. Both measures declined with 
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a reduction of the initial ownership at the post—IPO 
period. This can be the third support of the agency cost 
problem. 
Window dressing means that the pre-listed figures are 
overstated but the post-listed figures are understated. 
From the comparison between IPOs and matching firms of 
operating return on assets and operating profit margin, the 
superior pre-IPO performance and decline of p〇st-IP〇 
performance seems to support the explanation of window 
dressing. It is because the hidden loss is floating up at 
the post-IPO period. However, window dressing is not 
sufficient to explain why the IPO's performance 
continuously declines and do not return to the industry 
level. In addition, if theIPO's account is window dressed, 
the duration of decline should not be too long. By the 
existing regulation of SEHK, every listed company need to 
disclose their performance and financial status every half 
year. The information should be announced in the general 
meeting and published in the interim and annual report. The 
company account should also be audited by an independent 
accountant. If the performance of the company is not good, 
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management will be criticized by the shareholders in the 
general meeting. In this environment, the hidden cost is 
unlikely and could be "made up〃 continuously for three 
years. S〇,if the IPOs' account is window dressed then the 
post-IPO performance should return to the industry level 
after an initial decline. The continuous three years 
performance decline of the sample IPOs violates the 
1*7 
implication of window dressing. 
From table 8A. , the median level of net income 
deflated by fixed assets of IP〇s sub-sample 91 from 1991 to 
1994 are 0.4814, 0.5692, 0.3190 and 0.2087. After the first 
year increases, the measurement declines in the second and 
third year. The net income deflated by fixed assets of the 
91' s sub-sample is initially higher than the manufacturing 
sector but eventually drops to a level lower than the 
sector. When we examine the difference between the sub-
sample and matching firms, the difference decreases 
overtime. It is very likely that the value of the 91' s IP〇 
17 Here, performance rebound in post-IPO period is used as 
evidence to support window dressing. Since this thesis only 
covers three post—IPO years, it is possible that the window 
dressing argument may receive support by extending the time 
horizon to more than three years. 
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firms approaches to the level of the matching firms. The 
same measure of IP〇s sub-sample 92 from 1992 to 1995 are 
0.7619, 0.5 039, 0.1769 and 0.1322. The measure of 92's sub-
sample is also initially higher than the manufacturing 
sector, continuously decline at the post_IPO period and 
eventually reach a level lower than the manufacturing 
sector. The observation of the 92‘s sub-sample is different 
from the 91' s sub-sample in which the value of the 92 ‘ s 
sub-sample does not have any rebound at the post-IPO 
period； it is declining over the time. In addition, the 
difference between the 92 ‘ s sub-sample and matching firms 
is also decreasing over time during the post-IPO period. 
Similar to the 91's sub-sample, it is also approaching the 
level of the matching firms. 
From table 9A. , the median level of the net sales 
deflated by fixed assets of the sub-sample 91 from 1991 to 
1994 are 6.0651, 4.2001, 3.5107 and 3.2400. The same 
measure on sub-sample 92 from 1992 to 1995 are 5.6678, 
3.9809, 2.9835 and 2.5757. For the both sub-samples, the 
value declines continuously at the post-IPO period without 
any rebound. The difference between the sub-samples and 
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matching firms also decreases. So, the trend of this 
indicator, sales over fixed assets, is very similar to the 
trend of net income over fixed assets except that the pre-
IP〇 value of the 92 ‘ s sub-sample is lower than the 
manufacturing sector. 
Since there is no clear observation that the 
performance of the IP〇 firms drop below a certain level, 
manufacturing sector and/or matching firms, and rebound to 
the level again, it is difficult to conclude that the 
superior pre-IPO performance of the manufacturing IP〇 firms 
is due to the window dressing. 
Peak timing issue implies that management knows the 
firm more than outsidei:s. When the firm decides to publicly 
issue the holding company shares, information asymmetry 
between the original owner and the new shareholders will 
arise. The firm is operating at the period of "unusually" 
good performance and it is believed that this superior 
performance cannot not be sustained in the future. If it is 
required to raise capital, it is the best time. 
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From the comparison of the operating return on assets 
and operating profit margin between IP〇 firms and matching 
firms, it is also difficult to find evidence to support 
peak timing issue. As explained above, the trend of both 
measures declines over time, and do not approach the level 
of the matching firms. 
However, from the data of manufacturing IP〇s and 
manufacturing matching firms, it can be seen that peak 
timing can be supported by some extent. Since, for IP〇s 
sub-sample 91 and IP〇s sub-sample 92, both the net income 
over fixed assets and sales over fixed assets are initially 
higher than the level of manufacturing matching firms but 
decrease to the matching firms level gradually at post—IPO 
period. The difference between IPO and matching firms 
declines overtime. It is the "appropriate" observation 
implied by peak timing issue. Moreover, the initial 
superior performance of the IP〇 firms is also easy to 
understand. It is because the listing rules in Hong Kong 
restrict only the 、、good〃 firms to be listed on the Stock 
Exchange. The Exchange Rules require that firms applying 
for listing should successfully invite a underwriter for 
54 
subscription. It is because the underwriter not only serves 
as a promoter but also serves as an 、、examiner〃 of the firm 
applying listing. It is due to the reason that the un-
subscribed shares would be bought by the underwriter. If 
the firm is not "good" enough to attract the public 
interest, the underwriter will suffer by the loss of buying 
a "bad" firm. So, it is assumed that only 、、g〇〇d〃 firms can 
be listed. When this 、、good〃 IPO firm completes the public 
issue, the performance decline may be due to the agency 
cost problem and/or the un-sustainable superiority. S〇,the 
performance return to the level of the same kind of firms, 
i.e. listed manufacturing firms. 
Therefore, it gives support that manufacturing firms 
may choose to publicly issue at their superior time and 
peak timing receives support in manufacturing industry. 
6.3) P/E Comparison 
From table 10 and the results of Wilcoxon test and 
Sign test, the IPOs is、、expensive〃 in the market, relative 
to the stocks of similar business and capitalization. The 
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z-value of Wilcoxon test is 0.2844 and p-value is 0.3895. 
The p-value of Sign test is 0.12219. Both results are 
significant at 5% level which the null hypothesis of median 
P/E of IP〇s is equal to P/E of matching firms cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, for the same earning in the market, 
investor has to pay more for IPOs than other the stocks of 
similar business. 
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7. Comparison with the study in U.S. 
Jain and Kini (1994) studied the decline in the 
operating performance of the IP〇s in United States. They 
proved that the agency cost problem is one of the main 
reasons of the performance decline. They divided their 
sample into two separate sub-samples, named high-ownership 
and low-ownership. The better performance of the high-
ownership sub-sample support the existence of agency cost 
problem. 
In my sample, there are 61 IP〇s firms exactly issued 
25%, which is the minimum requirement of SEHK, to public. 
Excluding the three financial companies, there are only 39 
IPOs can be studied. Besides the small sample size, the 
small variation of post-IPO ownership is also another 
limitation for using Jain and Kini‘s method to study agency 
cost problem. ^ ^ Therefore, 工 use the information of Hong 
Kong manufacturing sector as a bench mark and compare the 
performance of the manufacturing IPO with the bench mark. 
18 The lowest retained ownership of after IP〇 is about 60% 
in my sample. S〇，the range of retained post-IPO ownership 
is between 60% and 75%. 
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The inferior performance of listed manufacturing firms, 
i.e. IP〇s, can serve as a support of agency cost problem. 
Jain and Kini also proposed the explanation of window 
dressing and peak timing issue. Following their idea,工 use 
the comparison among the Hong Kong manufacturing sector, 
manufacturing matching firms and manufacturing IPOs to 
prove the existence of window dressing and peak timing 
issue. 
In the matching process, they used the data in 
COMPUSTAT (a computerized database in U.S.) to match the 
performance of the IPO with the industry median. In my 
sample, when 工 restrict the matching process by (1) the 
same business, (2) similar size and (3) longer listing 
period for matching firms, the listed firms 工 can use to 
match with the IP〇 are very limited. For some cases, two to 
three IP〇s are matched with the same matching firm in the 
same industry. 
In addition, the matching process in my study is 
conducted manually.工 needed to classify the IPOs and other 
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listed firms before matching. Comparing with their 
computerized matching process, my method is more time 
consuming and may follow a different standard of 
19 
classification. 
Their paper showed the cumulative decline of operating 
return on assets for the IP〇s at the three p〇st—IP〇 year is 
less than 10%. In my study, there are 68.6% cumulative 
decrease in operating return on assets and 51.6% cumulative 
decrease in operating profit margin at the third post-IPO 
year for the IP〇s in Hong Kong. Even if 工 conclude the 
existence of peak timing issue, it seems insufficient to 
explain such large value of decline. I think that there 
should be another reason which is specific to Hong Kong at 
these particular two years. 
One of possible explanation is that most of these 
newly listed firms of Hong Kong in 1991 and 1992 used their 
publicly raised capital to invest in mainland China. In 
19 工 use International Standard Industrial Classification 
of all Economic Activities, issued by Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the 
United Nations to classify the IPOs and listed firms in 
Hong Kong. 
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chapter 3. the profile of IP〇 in Hong Kong,工 showed that 
there are 85 IP〇s (out of 102) have engaged their business 
in China-related business. In the wake of the hyper-growth 
in China, there was a very serious problem of inflation. 
The Chinese government has imposed the macroeconomic 
control. Most of the Hong Kong's investment and Chinese 
enterprises suffered a lot, for example, triangular debt 
problem. This cause most of the Hong Kong's investment in 
China suffer loss and the amount are very significant. This 
could be another main reason that can explain the 
significant cumulative lost of the IP〇 firms in Hong Kong 
in the post-IPO period. 
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8 . Summary 
The IP〇 firms of Hong Kong in 1991 and 1992 exhibit 
superior performance at the pre-IPO period. The operating 
performance measured by operating return on assets and 
operating profit margin decline at the post-IPO period. 
Moreover, the performance decline of IPO firms is more 
significant than the listed firms matched with similar 
business and size. In addition, the IPO firms exhibit much 
higher growth rate of sales at the post-IPO period. S〇,the 
inferior post-IPO performance cannot be attributed to the 
industry effect as well as lack of sales opportunities. 
The potential explanations of the operating 
performance decline include agency cost problem, window 
dressing and peak timing issue. The empirical results of 
the firms which processed initial public offerings in Hong 
Kong in 1991 and 1992 support the existence of agency cost 
problem but not window dressing and peaking timing issue, 
However, the comparison among Hong Kong manufacturing 
sector, manufacturing IPOs and manufacturing matching firms 
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support the existence of agency cost problem and the peak 
timing issue of the IPO firms in Hong Kong. 
In the stock market, the IP〇s is expensive. They have 
similar price to earning ratios with their matching firms. 
Therefore, to acquire the same earning in the market, 
investor has to pay more for IP〇s than stocks with similar 
business and capitalization. 
Besides, this study only covers the three years of 
post-IPO period. It is possible that a rebound of 
performance could be seen after a longer time study. So, 
window dressing could also receive support. Thus, extend 
the time horizon of this study may get another interesting 
result. 
Moreover, this is the first study of the operating 
performance of IP〇s in Asia. This could be an interest 
topic that whether other Asian financial markets, such as 
Japan, Singapore and Thailand, have the similar results of 
the operating performance of the IPOs. If the results is 
positive, the inferior post—IPO operating performance 
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becomes a common phenomenon in the major financial markets 
in the world. Therefore, study of operating performance of 




Table 2. Operating Return on Assets： 
Operating Profit / Total Assets 
Median 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 0.168854~~0 .13759 0.07929 0.041131 
Matching Firms 0.09137 0.079733 0.078114 0.057568 
Median of Change relative to the year of IPO 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
IPOs -0.23013 -0.54961 -0.68649 ~ 
Matching Firms 0.014118 0.051827 -0.2895 
Mean 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 0.18766 0.107832 0.06554 0.035613 
Matching Firms 0.097824~~0.089107 0.091956~~0 .080529 
Mean of Change relative to the year of IPO 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
IPOs -0.25976 -0.55576 -0.76357 
Matching Firms 0.089308 0.436829 -1.56514 
Table 3. Operating Profit Marain: 
Operation Profit / Sales 
Median 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 0.131583~~0.117006 0.071422~~0.059943~~ 
Matching Firms 0.080541~~0.080541 0.080485~~0 .08782 
Median of Change relative to the year of IPO 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to ~T3 
IPOs -0.03222 -0.32913 -0.5156 
Matching Firms 0.054307 0.039643 0.000088 
Mean 
“ TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 0.173392 0.119332 0.079077~~0.044883~~ 
Matching Firms 0.100129 0.106213 0.112277 0 .106881“ 
Mean of Change relative to the year of IPO 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
IPOs -0.25185 -0.53309 -0.76056 
Matching Firms 0.235194 0.674407 -2.22262 
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Table 4. Net Profit Margin： 
Net Profit / Sales 
Median 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 0.122509~~0.105026 0.072511~~0.066587 
Matching Firms 0.07499 0.079601~~0.089182~~0.079787~~ 
M e d i a n of Change relative to the year of IPO 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
IPOs -0.00743 -0.32251 -0.456 
Matching Firms 0.01626 0.076323 0.191971 
Mean 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs ‘ 0.179556 0.136738 0.075606 0.060731 
Matching Firms 一 0.106575 0.109783 0.120033 "5.09555 
M e a n of Change relative to the year o f I P O 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
IPOs~‘ -0.00736 -0.42658 -0.74957 
Matching Firms -1.5553 _0.209599 -9.17595 一 
Table 5. Sales Growth: 
Rate of Growth of Sales relative the year of IPO 
Median 
TO to T1 TO to.T2 TO to T3 
IPOs 0.213047 0.494622 0.654383 
Matching Firms 0.133739 0.327144 0.38094 
— Mean 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
IPOs 0.811153 1.244565 1.300418 
Matching Firms 0.101798 0.347994 0.468879 
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Table 6. Assets Turnover： 
Sales / Total Assets 
Median 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 1.347174~~1,083366 0.95364 0.93756 
Matching Firms 1.216507~~1.118438 0.954449 0.868752 
Median of Change relative to the year of IPO 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
IPOs -0.16356 -0.27971 -0.36634 
Matching Firms -0.09718 -0.11546 -0.13337 
Mean 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 1.509034 1.234903 1.111489 0.996467 
Matching Firms 1.120414 1.058310 0.990567 0.902789 
M e a n of Change relative to the year of IPO 
TO t o T1 TO t o T2 TO t O T3 
IPOs 0.172378 0.08972~~！ -0.06893 
Matching Firms -0.03136 -0.08506 -0.14467“ 
\ 
Table 7. Statistics of_l2Q_Firms_agnQmjn^tg^_hy_Fixed 
Aggetg 
Operation Profit / Fixed Assets 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 0.402268 0.451536 0.354234 0.270614 
Net Profit / Fixed Assets 
TO T1 T2 T3 
IPOs 0.331156 0.369356 0.305428 0.249413~ “ 
Sales / Fixed Assets 
TO T1 T2 T3 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10. Median P/E Ratio of IPOs and Matching Firms 
Time IPOs Matching Firms Difference 
Mar-92 9.1181 9.0722 0.0459 
Jun-92 11.133 10.1546 0.9784 
Sep-92 9.0556 8.5567 0.4989 
Dec-92 8.184 7.4708 0.6772 
Mar-93 8.4 10.5405 -2.1405 
Jun-93 9.9359 11.4629 -1.527 
Sep-93 1 0 . 5 1 2 . 3 9 6 7 - 1 . 8 9 6 7 
Dec-93 12.0893 10.0369 2.0524 
Mar-94 11.087 9.9182 1.1688 
Jun-94 10.5215 9.3711 1.1504 
Sep-94 9.4619 8.9937 0.4682 
Dec-94 7.8569 7.687 . 0.1699 
Mar-95 6.9147 7.8947 -0.98 、 
Jun-95 6.76 7.7632 -1.0032 
Sep-95 7.5 7.4342 0.0658 
Dec-95 8.1873 8.227 -0.0397 
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10« Results of Statistics Test 
Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test and Sign Test 
1. Operating Performance： Operating Profit/Total Assets 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
Median Change 
IPOs -0.23031 -0.54961 -0.68649 
Matching Firms 0.014118 0.051827 -0.2895 
n = 97 n = 97 n = 68 
Z-value Z-value Z-value 
Wilcoxon sign 
rank test -4.6363 -6.8600 -5.5299 
Sign test 4.6706 6.9044 4.7294 
2. Operating Profit deflated by Sales 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
Median change 
IPOs -0.03222 -0.32913 -0.5156 
Matching Firms 0.054307 0.039643 0.000088 、 
n = 98 n = 97 n = 68 
Z-value Z-value Z-value 
Wilcoxon sign 
rank test -3.1095 -6.1908 -6.0493 
Sign test 2.5254 5.0767 5.4571 
3. Net Profit deflated by Sales 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
Median change 
IPOs -0.007434 -0.322513 -0,456000 _ 
Matching Firms 0.016260 0.076322 0.191970 
n = 96 n = 96 n = 66 
Z-value Z-value Z-value —  
Wilcoxon sign 
rank test -1.5238 -6.0406 -5.9249 
Sign test 1.7351 5.2052 6.5238 
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4• Growth rate of Sales： 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
Median 
IPOs 0.213047 0.494622 0.654383 
Matching Firms 0.133739 0.327144 0.38094 
n = 98 n = 98 n = 68 
Z-value Z-value Z-value 
Wircoxon sign 
rank test -3.6552 -3.0315 -3.0124 
Sign test 2.9294 1.3132 1.5765 
5. Assets Turnover： Sales/Total Assets 
TO to T1 TO to T2 TO to T3 
Median change 
IPOs -0.16356 -0.27971 -0.36634 
Matching Firms -0.12328 -0.13452 -0.28039 
n = 98 n = 97 n = 68 , 
Z-value Z-value Z-value . 
Wilcoxon sign 
rank test -2.5319 -3.2510 -4.3445 
Sign Test 3.1315 3.6552 4.7294 
6. Price to Earning Ratio 
Ho： median P/E of IPOs = matching firms 
n = 16 
Wilcoxon sign rank test z-value = 0.2844 
p-value = 0.3895 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12. Appendix 1 
1991 ~ 1992 
Number of IPOs 48 ^i 102 (total) 
Capital raised 5.69 9.33 15.02 billion 
(HK$) billion billion (2 year total) 
Subscription rate 18.64 70.82 46.27~~(2 year 
(average) (average) average) 
Number of firms 30 H 61 (total) 
issued exactly 25% 
in public offer 
Number of l3 D 26 (total) 
electronic firms 





12. Appendix 1 
Firms processed IPO from 1991 to 1992 in Hong Kong 
Company Name Listing date Subscription Capital raised 
(dd/mm/yy) rate HK$million 
1 Golden Island 25/l/91 18.60 54.69 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
2 Golden Resources 28/l/91 22.80 88.5 
Development Int. Ltd. 
3 • Process Automation 3l/l/91 1.03 80.6 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
4 Team Concepts Holdings 13/2/91 103.67 46.88 
Ltd. 
5 Ming Pao Enterprise 22/3/91 26.70 217.5 
Corporation Ltd. 
6 Chee Shing Holdings 26/3/91 50.00 ^ 5 
Ltd. • 
7 Great Wall Electronic 15/4/91 58.40 164.8 
International Ltd. 
8 Tung Wing Steel 30/4/91 63.30 86.7 
Holdings Ltd. 
~ T ~ China Paint Holdings 21/5/91 153.20 99.36 
Ltd. 
10 Frankie Dominion 27/5/91 33.30 ^ 
International Ltd. 
"T3~ Giordano Holdings 19/6/91 ~"” 0.87 290.28 
Ltd. V • 
T J " Varitronix l/7/91 1.92 170.5 
International Ltd. 
13 Harbour Ring Int. 5/7/91 4.31 362.56 
Holding Ltd. 
~ n ~ W o Kee Hong (Holdings) 16/7/91 — 5.84 330.58 
Ltd. 
15 Anex International 18/7/91 13.06 82.5 
Holdings Ltd. 
16 Lam Soon Food 24/7/91 10.00 167.42 
Industries Ltd. 
17 Benelux International 25/7/91 19.40 56.81 
Ltd. 
18 Truly International 29/7/91 29.20 75.48 
Holdings Ltd. 
19 Star Paging (Int. l/8/91 5.70 W 7 1 
Holding) Ltd. 
20 Hsin Chong 14/8/91 15.90 137.5 
Construction Group 
Ltd. 
21 Yip ‘ s Hang Cheung 22/8/91 ~ l .50 125 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
• 22 Yau Lee Holdings 29/8/91 8 . 80 179.92 
Ltd. 
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23 |Orient Power Holdings~~ 2/9/9l| 2.43| ^ 
Ltd. 
24 Acme Landis Holdings 16/9/91 5 .15 40. 8 
Ltd. 
25 Righteous (Holdings) 16/9/91 27.50 6? 
Ltd. 
26 Leefung-Asco Printers 20/9/91 15.70 77.5 
Holdings Ltd. 
27 UDL 30/9/91 27.13 120 
Holdings Ltd. 
28 Innovative Int. 3/l0/91 4.76 1 ^ 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
29 JCG 3/10/91 1.55 136.32 
Holdings Ltd. 
30 International Pipe 7/l0/91 1.57 54.6 
Ltd. 
31 Management Investment 7/l0/91 17,30 39.96 
& Technology Ltd. 
32 ABC Communications 9/10/91 3.00 125 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
3 T " Fairwood 9/10/91 28.80 115.55 
Holdings Ltd. 
34 Yiu Wing International 2l/lO/91 6.30 “ 65 
Holdings Ltd. 
35 Chen Hsong Holdings 22/10/91 5.34 ~ ~ 214.2 
Ltd. 
36 Tertnbray Industries 23/10/91 2.28 ~" ~ 2 2 4 
Int. (Holdings) Ltd. “ 
37 Yanion International 25/10/91 8.43 “ 75 
Holdings Ltd. 
"3S"Tak Sing Alliance l/ll/91 2.90 88.5 
Holdings Ltd. 
"5F"Double Kingdom ““ 11/11/91 2.00 一 90 
Holdings Ltd. 
"40"Nam Pei Hong 27/11/91 6.00 30.22 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
T T " Styland “ 5/l2/91 ~~ 15.90 66 
Holdings Ltd. 
T T " Jinhui 6/12/91 3.40 U o 
Holdings Co Ltd. 
43 Hanwah 10/12/91 2.63 128 
Holdings Ltd. 
44 Far East Aluminum 12/12/91 1. 80 “ 66 . 6 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
45 Hanny Magnetics 16/12/91 1.28 i99.8 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
46 Top Form International 16/12/91 2.50 i33.13 
Ltd. 
47 Pak Fah Yeow 18/12/91 48.60 35.1 
International Ltd. 
48 S. Megga International 30/12/91 3.20 i09.2 
Holdings Ltd. 
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49 |Silver Eagle Holdings~~ 22/l/92| 11.45| 75 
Ltd. 
50 Kong Wah 28/l/92 18.34 345 
Holdings Ltd. 
51 Shun Shing Holdings 11/2/92 6 . 57 181.44 
Ltd. 
52 Hoi Sing 13/2/92 29.20 54.5 
Holdings Ltd. 
53 Climax International 11/3/92 27.71 145.2 
Co Ltd. 
54 Hung Hing Printing 16/3/92 39.85 H s 
Group Ltd. 
55 Same Time 25/3/92 ~~17.33 71.5 
Holdings Ltd. 
56 Hansom 30/3/92 115.80 ‘ 46.88 
Holdings Ltd. 
57 Topstyle International 8/4/92 27.33 • 85.41 
Holdings Ltd. 
58 Eastern Century 9/4/92 30.75 97.85 
Holdings Ltd. 
59 Capital Automation 15/4/92 54.07 1 ^ 
Holdings Ltd. 
60 Hop Ying International 15/4/92 24.16 39.25 
Holdings Ltd. 
61 Ocean Information 15/4/92 24.42 ~50 
Holdings Ltd. 
62 BALtrans 1/5/92 34.21 ~ ^ 
Holdings Ltd. 
63 Welback~~~ 10/6/92 94.29 56.25 
Holdings Ltd. 
64 Li & Fung 1/7/92 28.15 “ 275 
Ltd. 
65 Yue Yuen Industrial 2/7/92 44.39 649 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
66 Mansion Holdings 6/7/92 79.19 56.25 
Ltd. 
67 Hai Hong Holdings Co 15/7/92 373.75 91.88 
Ltd. 
68 High Fashion 4/8/92 16.19~~ 174.75 
International Ltd. 
6 9 Texwinca 6/8/92 91.62 i75•1 
Holdings Ltd. 
70 Winton Holdings 13/8/92 17.75 — 24S" 
(Bermuda) Ltd. 
71 Indesen Industries Co 18/8/92 i.00^"~ 93.75 
Ltd. 
72 SIS International 18/8/92 2.93 63.8 
Holdings Ltd. 
73 Champion Technology 19/8/92 90.93 2i0 
Holdings Ltd. 
74 Eu Yan Sang (Hong 19/8/92 237.82 35.1 
Kong) Ltd. 
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75 |China Overseas Land &~~ 20/8/92| 98 . 67| 844 . 6 
Investment Ltd. 
76 Wai Kee 28/8/92 78.26 168.3 
Holdings Ltd. 
77 Fung Cheung Kee 3/9/92 2.18 128 
Holdings Ltd. 
78 Chung Tai Printing 10/9/92 1.50 ^ 
Holdings Ltd. 
79 Pam & Frank Int. 16/9/92 21.61 104.5 
Holdings Ltd. 
8 0 Goldlion 18/9/92 38.84 236.25 
Holdings Ltd. 
81 Ryoden Development 24/9/92 16.60 405 
Ltd. 
82 Ngai Lik Industrial 25/9/92 1.08 82.5 
Holdings Ltd. 
83 Pico Far East Holdings 28/9/92 8.78 50 
Ltd. 
84 Sharp Brave Holdings 30/9/92 1 • 09 84 .38 
Ltd. 
85 Shun Cheong Holdings 7/10/92 0.11 — 66.3 
Ltd. 
86 Firstone International 8/10/92 53.57 63.25 
Holdings Ltd. 
87 HKCB Bank Holding Co 12/10/92 48.29 4i^ 
Ltd., The 
88 M.C. Packaging (Hong 14/10/92 136.14 2 ^ 
Kong) Ltd. 
89 Perfectech Int. 23/10/92 2.18 “‘ 41：2 
Holdings Ltd. 
80 Four Seas Travel 27/10/92 309.30 ““^ 32 
International Ltd. 
81 City Chiu Chow 30/l0/92 57.82 “ 48.64 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
92 Allan International ~ 10/ll/92 57.78 72.1 
Holdings Ltd. 
93 China Travel Int. ll/ll/92 412.23 — ~ ~ 4 ^ 
Investment H.K. Ltd. 
94 Star Entertainment 12/ll/92 ~ 7.99 3±. 88 
(Int. Holding) Ltd. 
95 Watary International 23/11/92 259.49 “ T7g" 
Holdings Ltd. 
96 Lamex 26/11/92 305.14 91.88 
Holdings Ltd. 
97 Alco 27/11/92 25.75. 9 ^ 3 
Holdings Ltd. 
98 Leung Kee 2/l2/92 30.22 ~"“ Jg 
Holdings Ltd. 
99 Le Saimda 11/12/92 64.07 1 ^ 
Holdings Ltd. 
100 Guangzhou Investment 15/12/92 230.46 445 25 
Co. Ltd. ‘ 
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101 |Yaohan Food Processing 16/l2/92| 15.28| 70.63 
& Trading Co. Ltd. 




12. Appendix 1 
Manufacturing IPO Firms 
1 |Alco Holdings Ltd. 
2 Allan International Holdings Ltd. 
3 Anex International Holdings Ltd. 
‘4 Benelux International Ltd. 
5 Capital Automation Holdings Ltd. 
6 Champion Technology Holdings Ltd. 
7 Chen Hsong Holdings Ltd. 
8 Climax International Co Ltd. 
9 Double Kingdom Holdings Ltd. 
10 Eu Yan Sang (Hong Kong) Ltd. 
11 Far East Aluminum (Holdings) Ltd. 
12 Firstone International Holdings Ltd. 
13 Frankie Dominion International Ltd. 
14 Giordano Holdings Ltd. 
15 Goldlion Holdings Ltd. 
16 Great Wall Electronic International Ltd. 
17 Hai Hong Holdings Co Ltd. 
18 Hanny Magnetics (Holdings) Ltd. 
19 Hanwah Holdings Ltd. 
20 Harbour Ring International Holding Ltd. 
21 High Fashion International Ltd. 
22 Hop Ying International Holdings Ltd. 
23 Hung Hing Printing Group Ltd. 
24 Indesen Industries Co Ltd. 
25 Innovative International~~(Holdings)~"Ltd. ‘ 
26 International Pipe Ltd. 
27 Kong Wah Holdings Ltd. “ 
28 Lam Soon Food Industries Ltd. ‘ 
29 Lamex Holdings Ltd. 
30 Le Saunda Holdings Ltd. “ 
31 M. C. PACKAGING (Hong Kong) Ltd. ‘ 
32 Nam Pei Hong (Holding) Ltd. ‘ 
33 Ocean Information Holdings Ltd. ‘ 
34 Orient Power Holdings Ltd. ‘ 
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35 |Pam & Frank International Holdings Ltd. 
36 Perfectech International Holdings Ltd. 
37 Process Automation (Holdings) Ltd. 
38 S. Megga International Holdings Ltd. 
3 9 Same Time Holdings Ltd. 
40 Sharp Brave Holdings Ltd. 
41 Silver Eagle Holdings Ltd. 
42 Styland Holdings Ltd. 
^3 Tak Sing Alliance Holdings Ltd. 
44 Team Concepts Holdings Ltd. 
45 Termbray Industries International (Holdings) Ltd.~~ 
46 Top Form International Ltd. “ 
47 Topstyle International Holdings Ltd. 
48 Truly International Holdings Ltd. 
49 Tung Wing Steel Holdings Ltd. 
50 Varitronix international Ltd. 
51 Watary International Holdings Ltd. 
52 Welback Holdings Ltd. 
53 Yanion International Holdings Ltd. 
54 Yaohan Food Processing & Trading Co, Ltd. 
55 Yips Hang Cheung~~(Holdings)”Ltd. " 
56 Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Ltd. 、 
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a 
12. Appendix 1 
Firms issued exactly 25% in IPO 
Company Name 
1 Team Concepts Holdings Ltd. 
2 Ming Pao Enterprise Corporation Ltd. 
3 Great Wall Electronic International Ltd. 
- 4 Frankie Dominion International Ltd. 
5 Giordano Holdings Ltd. 
6 Anex International Holdings Ltd. 
7 Lam Soon Food Industries Ltd. 
8 Benelux International Ltd. 
9 Truly International Holdings Ltd. ~ “ 
10 Yau Lee Holdings Ltd. 
11 Orient Power Holdings Ltd. 
12 Acme Landis Holdings Ltd. “ 
13 Righteous~~(Holdings) Ltd. 
14 Leefung-Asco Printers Holdings Ltd. 
~Is“JCG Holdings Ltd. 
16 International Pipe Ltd. 
17 Management Investment & Technology (Holdings) Ltd.~~ 
18 ABC Communications~~(Holdings)~""Ltd. 
19 Fairwood Holdings Ltd. 
20 Chen Hsong Holdings Ltd. 
21 Yanion International Holdings Ltd. .. 
~~^~~Tak Sing Alliance Holdings Ltd. 
23 Double Kingdom Holdings Ltd, “ 
~~5i~Nam Pei Hong (Holdings) Ltd. 
25 Styland Holdings Ltd. 
26 Jinhui Holdings Co Ltd. ~~~ 
~~^~Hanwah Holdings Ltd. 一 
28 Far East Aluminum (Holdings) Ltd. “~~ 
29 ^ n n y Magnetics (Holdings) Ltd. ‘~~ 
30 Top Form International Ltd. 
~"3l“Kong Wah Holdings Ltd. “ 
~ 3 2 ~ H o i Sing Holdings Ltd. 
33 Hansom Holdings Ltd. ‘ 
34 Eastern Century Holdings Ltd. ‘ “ 
35 Capital Automation Holdings Ltd. 
36 Ocean Information Holdings Ltd. 
37 R^trans Holdings Ltd. ‘ “ 
38 ^lback Holdings Ltd. 
~^~~Mansion Holdings Ltd. 
4 0 ^ i Hong Holdings Co Ltd" “ ‘ 
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41 Texwinca Holdings Ltd. 
42 Winton Holdings~~(Bermuda) Ltd. 
43 SIS International Holdings Ltd. 
44 Eu Yan Sang (Hong Kong) Ltd. 
45 China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. 
46 Fung Cheung Kee Holdings Ltd. — 
47 Chung Tai Printing Holdings Ltd. 
~~48~~~Goldlion Holdings Ltd. 
49 Ryoden Development Ltd. 
-50 Sharp Brave Holdings Ltd. 
51 Shun Cheong Holdings Ltd. 
"""52~~M.C. Packaging (Hong Kong) Ltd. 
53 Perfectech International Holdings Ltd.“ 
54 Four Seas Travel International Ltd. 
~~55~City Chiu Chow (Holdings) Ltd. 
56 China Travel International Investment Hong Kong 
Ltd. 
57 Star Entertainment~~(International Holding)~~Ltd. 
58 Alco Holdings Ltd. 
59 Leung Kee Holdings Ltd. 
60 Guangzhou Investment Co Ltd. 
61 Yaohan Food Processing & Trading Co, Ltd. 
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